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Abstract
Since the idea of attributions was famously discussed by Fritz Heider (1958), a wide
array of empirical research has focused on the phenomenon. Included within the sphere
of attributional theories are internal attributions, which have been of particular interest to
the psychological community for decades. Although there is no comprehensive theory
for why people make these attributions, literature points to establishing control as a
possible motivator. In addition, research suggests that people may make more extreme
internal attributions about minorities, particularly when they are not aware they are
relying on stereotypes. Participants (N = 377) observed a modified version of the
quizmaster paradigm (Ross, Amabile & Steinmetz, 1977), which relies on the
Fundamental Attribution Error. They first completed a control manipulation that either
deprived their sense of person control or left it unaffected. Then, they watched a video
depicting the quizmaster paradigm with either a black contestant or a white contestant.
After the video, they rated quizmasters, contestants and themselves based on intelligence.
Although the quizmaster paradigm proved to be robust, neither Race nor Control affected
the strength of the internal attributions participants made. The lack of significant findings
suggest that further research needs to be conducted to ascertain the causality of internal
attributions.
Keywords: Internal Attributions, Fundamental Attribution Error, Control, Racial Biases

WHY WE ASK WHY

5

Why we Ask Why:
The Ways in Which Control and Stereotyping Biases Affect Internal Attributions
Despite decades of research devoted to the ways we explain human behavior,
many questions on this topic remain unanswered. Classic research on the perceptions of
observed behavior have unearthed many phenomena, with some of the most influential
being attribution theories. (Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Heider, 1958; Liu & Steele, 1986;
Peturson, Cramer & Pomerleau, 2011; Pittman & Pittman, 1980; Ross, 1977; Ross,
Amabile & Steinmetz, 1977). Attribution theories have accumulated much interest since
their inception, with some psychologists referring to them as some of the most
fundamental phenomena to social psychology (Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Ross, 1977).
Despite the wealth of research attribution theories have inspired, very few studies have
focused on why they occur. Instead, much of the existing literature focuses on how they
occur. Due to this, there is no widely accepted model for explaining attribution theories.
Given the impact and breadth of interest they have sparked within the field of
psychology, it is only appropriate that further research focuses on determining the
motivations for making attributions.
Attributions
Attribution theories are a collection of biases, errors, and paradigms that utilize
similar ideas and produce similar results, yet are distinct phenomena (Gilbert & Malone,
1995). In a general sense, attribution theories describe the ways in which humans
perceive and explain the observed behavior of others. Attributions are typically split into
two categories: internal and external (Heider, 1958). When a person observes the
behavior of another and they begin to ask themselves why that person did what they did,
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they will typically explain it in one of two ways: either as a result of internal
characteristics such as a personality trait or as a result of external influences such as peer
pressure. The former is what social psychologists call internal attributions, while the
latter are referred to as external attributions (Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Heider, 1958;
Peturson, Cramer & Pomerleau, 2011; Ross, Amabile & Steinmetz, 1977).
The Fundamental Attribution Error
As previously mentioned, internal and external attributions are key components to
a variety of related theories. Among these theories rest the focus of this study: The
Fundamental Attribution Error (FAE). FAE refers to the tendency for humans to make
internal attributions rather than external attributions when explaining observed behavior
(Eberhardt, 1999; Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Heider, 1958; Ross, Amabile & Steinmetz,
1977; Skitka, Mullen, Griffin, Hutchinson & Chamberlin, 2002). However, even with this
definition, FAE is best understood when put in the context of everyday occurrences. For
example, imagine a person who slipped while walking down a flight of stairs, causing
them to significantly injure themselves. For the sake of this example, it would be
important to note that their accident was due to an uncontrollable yet minor external force
(i.e. the stairs were slick in that one spot, they tripped over something unseen etc.). When
a nearby witness instinctively wondered why that person fell, it would be automatic for
them to assume it was because that person was clumsy. It should be noted that this
process seems to be an instinctive cognitive function that occurs without the observer
deliberately contemplating the event (Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Skitka et al., 2002). FAE
can be extended to a variety of situations, including ones more harmless than our
previous example, such as a student who is ten minutes late to class. Instead of
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considering that student may have been the victim of a shoddy bus schedule, a professor
and surrounding classmates might assume that student is late because they are lazy or
irresponsible.
Although attribution theories have been a prominent topic in social psychology
since Fritz Heider (1958) proposed them, FAE was not introduced to the psychological
literature for another 20 years (Ross, 1977). The error was initially proposed by Lee Ross
following his classic experiment commonly dubbed the quizmaster paradigm (Ross et al.,
1977). In this original paradigm, participants completed a mock game show where they
were assigned to one of three roles: quizmasters, contestants, and observers. As the
names suggest, quizmasters asked ten general knowledge questions from their own
knowledge bank, contestants attempted to answer these questions, and observers
observed the quiz game. As to be expected, contestants largely failed to answer the
questions correctly. However, when asked to rate the intelligence of quizmasters and
contestants, observers consistently rated quizmasters as more intelligent than contestants,
despite clear situational constraints (Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Ross et al., 1977). The
effects of this paradigm are proven to be robust and consistent (Gilbert & Malone, 1995;
Krull et al., 1999; Peturson et al., 2011; Skitka et al., 2002 etc.).
Following the introduction of attributions and FAE, a wide array of psychological
research has been devoted to understanding their specific mechanisms. However, most of
the existing literature investigate how people commit the error, rather than why. Research
suggests that people commit FAE instinctively and automatically, meaning that it often
occurs without deliberate cognitive effort on the part of the observer (Gilbert & Malone,
1995; Skitka et al., 2002). A prominent overview of the literature regarding general
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attribution theories outlines general attributions as occurring in four steps that largely
revolve around assessing a situation and determining typical behavior in that situation. If
an actor’s behavior falls within expected norms, then external attributions will be made.
However, if an actor’s behavior falls outside of expected norms, then internal attributions
will be made (Gilbert & Malone, 1995). In the previously described quizmaster
paradigm, observers assessed the situation of the mock quiz game, however they
incorrectly assessed the true difficulty of the task contestants were assigned to. Therefore,
their incorrect assessment caused them to determine typical behavior from a perception of
the situation that did not reflect reality (Gilbert & Malone, 1995). Thus, when a
contestant failed to answer most of the questions, observers attributed this to a lack of
intelligence due to their fundamental misunderstanding of the situation. Alternatively,
research shows that even after an internal attribution has been formed, it can be rejected if
there is proper motivation to do so (Skitka et al., 2002).
Deprivation of Control
Now that the process of how people commit FAE has been established, it is time
to ask ourselves why people commit it. Although several theories exist to generally
explain why attributions are made, very little time has been taken to empirically examine
any of these theories in the context of FAE. One commonly proposed, yet largely
untested theory, is that of control. It is well established throughout social psychology that
people crave control. Thus, depriving them of control causes them to seek out systems
and strategies to reestablish it (Heider, 1958; Kelley, 1969; Kelley, 1971; Landau, Kay &
Whitson, 2015; Liu & Steele, 1986; Ma, Landau, Narayanan & Kay, 2017; Pittman &
Pittman, 1980; Rothbaum, Weisz & Snyder, 1982).
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Attributions have been proposed as a strategy for reestablishing control since the
inception of attribution theories (Heider, 1958). While Heider agreed that establishing
control is a possible explanation (Harvey, Ickes, & Kidd, 1976), one of the most wellknown arguments for control as a motivator came from famed social psychologist Harold
Kelley (1971). According to him, attributing an outcome to an internal characteristic
gives people the notion that the outcome will be repeated, since internal characteristics
are presumably constant, and thus can be predicted and viewed as controllable (Harvey et
al., 1976; Kelley, 1969; Kelley, 1971). An analysis of the relationship between
attributions and control found that people often minimize chance as a contributor to
unrelated events and minimize the role of situational constraints to both personal and
impersonal predicaments (Wortman, 1976). It must be noted that this study did not
investigate attributions regarding observed persons, but the role of self-attributions in
establishing environmental control. However, this trend of minimizing chance and
situational constraints to avoid unpredictable outcomes provides a fundamental basis for
why people form internal attributions.
Expanding on this idea, Pittman and Pittman (1980) found that increasing
deprivation of control in participants resulted in more extreme internal attributions. This
study provided evidence for the hypothesis that depriving people of control increases the
motivation to reestablish control through internal attributions. However, it must be noted
that this experiment did not investigate FAE, but a related attribution theory called the
observer bias (Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Jones & Harris, 1967; Liu & Steele, 1986;
Pittman & Pittman, 1980). Even though both FAE and the observer bias describe how
perceived behavior and internal attributions intersect, there is one important difference
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that distinguishes them. In the quizmaster paradigm, contestants are constrained by what
is called a behavioral constraint (Gilbert & Malone, 1995). In this type of situational
constraint, actors behave as they do because their options are limited due to an external
factor. Within the quizmaster paradigm, contestants are constrained by the inane
questions of the quizmaster. Thus, if the contestant does not know the answer to the
question their behavior is limited to answering incorrectly, despite their own wants,
feelings, thoughts, or desires (Gilbert & Malone, 1995). The paradigm used by Pittman
and Pittman (1980) differs in that participants read a student essay in favor of Fidel
Castro, wherein half of the participants were told students were free to choose their
stance and the other half were told students were assigned stances by their instructor.
Given the effects of attributions, participants in both conditions unsurprisingly believed
that the student held pro-Castro beliefs, even with the knowledge that the student had
been assigned the position (Jones & Harris, 1967; Liu & Steele, 1986; Pittman &
Pittman, 1980). This paradigm relies on what is called a psychological constraint (Gilbert
& Malone, 1995). This constraint differs from behavioral constraints in that the situation
does not directly limit an actor’s options. Instead, it simply changes their perception of
those options. Theoretically, the student assigned to the pro-Castro stance could write an
anti-Castro essay, however the motivation of obtaining a good grade limits their behavior.
Although this difference may seem pedantic, it is an important distinction that
separates FAE and the observer bias as two different paradigms that produce similar
results. Thus, while ample literature exists to suggest control could be a motive for
committing FAE, no studies exist that specifically and empirically investigate their
relationship. Assuming control is a motivation for making internal attributions, the main
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hypothesis of this study is that when people are deprived of a personal sense of control
they will be more likely to make more extreme internal attributions in the context of
FAE.
If this hypothesis is not rejected, then this research will provide a working theory
to explain one of social psychology’s most fundamental phenomena. Much analysis
surrounding attributions have theorized control as an explanation, but little experimental
research exists to confirm this and no research specifically investigates FAE. This study
aims to correct the gap in the current literature and solidify the theory of control as a
viable explanation for why attributions are spontaneously created.
Racial Stereotyping Biases
With a viable hypothesis established for why we ask why, its time to investigate
the different contexts that may affect the strength of internal attributions. A secondary
aim of this study is to analyze the ways racial stereotypes and internal attributions
intersect within the context of FAE. It is well-acknowledged within the psychological
field that black people are commonly stereotyped as unintelligent (Devine & Elliot, 1995;
Kobach & Potter, 2013; Steele, 1997; Steele & Aronson, 1995; Yoo & Pituc, 2013).
Additionally, research suggests that most contemporary racial stereotypes are expressed
through implicit racism, or racism that is unconscious and often masked by mitigating
factors (Banaji & Greenwald, 2013; Dovidio, Kawakami & Gaertner, 2002; Fiske, 2000;
Greenwald & Banaji, 1995) In the context of FAE, this means that observers who watch a
mock quiz game involving a black contestant and a white quizmaster might be motivated
by racial stereotypes to rate black contestants as exceptionally unintelligent when
compared to a white contestant. However, instead of attributing their low ratings of black
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contestants to racial stereotypes, observers can highlight the contestants’ inability to
answer questions in a distinct example of implicit racism. Although no research to my
knowledge exists that examines the effect of racial stereotypes on FAE, several studies
have found evidence for a general link between racial stereotypes and attributions (Hart
& Morry, 1996; Lukyste, Waite, Avery & Roy, 2013; Miller, Baer & Staggenborg, 1977).
Similarly, research suggests that FAE and gender stereotypes intersect. In fact,
when observers are presented with gender minorities and aren’t aware they might be
relying on stereotypes, observers will be more likely to rate female contestants as less
intelligent than comparable male contestants (Peturson et al., 2011). Due to the literature
which links attributions and racial stereotypes, there is no reason to think racial
stereotypes and FAE would interact differently than gender stereotypes and FAE.
Although FAE is a convenient model for participants to express implicit racism, it
does not explain why participants might rely on stereotypes when making internal
attributions. One prominent explanation is the idea of salience. Research shows that
changing the prominence of a point of view can cause people to attribute more
importance to and be more reliant on what is visually salient in that point of view (Duval,
Duval & Neely, 1979; Storms, 1973). Moreover, observers tend to make more extreme
attributions about stimuli that has been made more salient (McArthur & Solomon, 1978;
Morry, 1996; Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff & Ruderman, 1978). This can further be applied to the
salience of race. In terms of racial biases, psychologists theorize that observers find
members of outgroups (i.e. racial minorities) to be more salient when compared to
ingroup members (Fiske, 2000). Thus, given the impact salient features can have on point
of view and the evidence for race as a salient feature, evidence suggests that participants
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would emphasize the importance of race in black contestants participating in the
quizmaster paradigm. This may trigger implicit stereotypes of unintelligence regarding
black people observers hold, therefore causing participants to rate black contestants lower
than white contestants.
Given the existing literature, it is expected that when participants view the mock
quiz game devised by Ross et al. (1977) with a white quizmaster and black contestant,
they will make more extreme internal attributions regarding the intelligence of the black
contestant when compared to a white contestant. Although research suggests that FAE
can be affected by gender stereotypes, very little data similarly links racial stereotypes
and FAE. If this study finds support for this link, then this will showcase the widespread
impact of implicit racial biases.
Current Research
The culmination of the current research suggests control as a viable motivator for
creating internal attributions, with racial stereotypes acting as a secondary effect. The
present study thus investigates the legitimacy of the control hypothesis using the
previously described quizmaster paradigm. Participants completed a manipulation which
either deprived them of self-control or had no effect on their self-control before viewing a
video of a quizmaster scenario. Additionally, participants either viewed a video with a
black contestant or a white contestant. I hypothesize that participants who are deprived of
control will be more likely to make extreme internal attributions regarding the contestant.
Similarly, participants who observe a black contestant will be more likely to make
extreme internal attributions regarding the contestant when compared to those who
observe a white contestant. Finally, I hypothesize that these two variables will interact
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and participants who were deprived of control and viewed a black contestant will be the
most likely to make the most extreme internal attributions.
Method
Participants
377 participants (Mage = 19.15, SD = 2.49, age range: 18-53 years) were recruited
from a pool of University of Arkansas students enrolled in an introductory psychology
course. As compensation for participating, they received credit to fulfill a course
requirement. The majority of participants were female (71.7%) and White (78.8%).
However Hispanic (7.1%), Black (5.3%), Asian (3.2%) and Native American (1.9%)
participants were also present. A total of 3.4% participants additionally identified as
“Other”.
Construction of Stimuli
The four videos utilized in this study were modeled after Ross’ quizmaster
paradigm (1977) and were constructed using participants from a previous study.
Participants (N = 14) were University of Arkansas students enrolled in an introductory
psychology course and were selected from a prescreening survey. Participants were
recruited through email and were only selected if they marked their race as either White
or Black in the prescreening survey. Upon entering the lab, participants were paired with
a confederate who was consistent among all sessions. Participants were then assigned to
the role of the contestant, while the confederate was assigned to the role of the
quizmaster. Participants were led to believe that the roles of quizmaster and contestant
were randomly assigned. Following role assignments, the research assistant explained
that the session would be videotaped and, after obtaining audible consent, began
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videotaping the remainder of the session. The research assistant proceeded to explain the
format of the trivia scenario and the quizmaster and contestant roles. The research
assistant instructed the quizmaster to generate ten general knowledge questions.
However, the ten questions were consistent across all sessions. Following this, the
research assistant instructed them to ask the contestant all of their questions within a tenminute time period. If the contestant did not answer the question correctly, the research
assistant instructed the quizmaster to give the correct answer.
Following the conclusion of the trivia scenario, the research assistant stopped the
video recording, dismissed the confederate and debriefed the participant. Participants
were informed that their video might be used in a future study and their verbal consent
was obtained. Finally, participants were asked to not reveal any of the study’s details
before being thanked for their time.
From the videos obtained from these sessions, four were ultimately chosen. Two
of the videos showed a black contestant and the remaining two videos showed a white
contestant. All the videos were selected based on time of the video, clarity of the video,
clarity of contestant race, and mood of the contestant. In order to ensure the videos were
consistent across these variables, two of the videos chosen included a contestant who
answered one question correctly and two included a contestant who answered no
questions correctly. Of the two videos with contestants who answered one question
correctly, one contestant was black and the other was white. Similarly, between the two
videos of contestants who answered no questions correctly, one contestant was black and
the other contestant was white. No a priori hypothesis existed regarding the number of
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correct answers and preliminary analysis showed no significant effect of this variable.
Thus, all further analysis collapses over this variable.
Procedure
This study was a 2 (contestant race; black contestant, white contestant) x 2
(control; deprivation of control, no deprivation of control) between-subjects design. All
participants completed an online survey which consisted of a personal control
manipulation, a video, several sets of questions, and a symbolic racism scale. The survey
began with the personal control manipulation, which was presented as a memory task
with two variations. The memory task was originally created by Kay et al. (2008) to
manipulate personal control. Participants were asked to “Please try and think of
something positive that happened to you in the few months that was [not] your fault (i.e.,
that you had [absolutely no] control over). Please describe this event as vividly as you
can in 4-6 sentences,” (Kay et al., 2008).
On the following page, participants read a brief excerpt explaining the trivia
scenario they were about to watch. The excerpt explained that the quizmaster and
contestant were participants in a previous study and that their roles were randomly
assigned. After reading this page, participants viewed one of the four videos. The videos
began with an off-screen research assistant giving instructions to the quizmaster
regarding question generation. Although the videos showed the quizmaster creating their
questions, these sections of the videos were sped up to maintain participant interest. The
remainder of the videos followed the procedure outlined previously. Once the quizmaster
and contestant finished the trivia game, the videos ended. All the videos lasted in between
four minutes and twenty seconds and four minutes and forty seconds.
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After viewing the video, participants rated the relative intelligence and general
knowledge of the quizmaster, the contestant, and themselves using a 100 point Likert
scale similar to that used by Ross et al. (1997). It was noted within the instructions that 0
represented an extremely small amount of intelligence or general knowledge and 100
represented an extremely large amount of intelligence or general knowledge. For the
purposes of data analysis, the intelligence and general knowledge items were combined
into composite scores for both quizmasters r(377) = .435, p < .001 and contestants
r(377) = .598, p < .001. An additional item was presented to participants that asked them
to rate how likely they thought the contestant or quizmaster would succeed at a general
knowledge-based game show on a100 point Likert scale similar to those used for the
previous two items. This question was exploratory and thus was removed from
subsequent analysis. Other items on the questionnaire included several attention checks.
Following the completion of this questionnaire, participants finished the study with the
symbolic racism scale (Henry & Sears, 2002). Typical items on this scale asked
participants to rate how much they agreed with statements such as, “It’s really a matter of
some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they could be just as
well off as whites,” or asked their opinions of statements such as, “Some say that black
leaders have been trying to push too fast. Others feel that they haven’t pushed fast
enough. What do you think?” The items on this scale were reverse scored where
necessary and then averaged to form a symbolic racism index (α = .80).1
The study concluded with a debriefing page that described the research
hypotheses, asked participants to not discuss the details of the study with potential
participants, and thanked them for their time.
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Results
First, I hypothesized that the results of this study would replicate the results of
Ross et al. (1977); in that study, contestants were consistently rated lower in intelligence
when compared to quizmasters (as is the primary expression of FAE). I additionally
hypothesized that participants deprived of personal control will be more likely to make
stronger internal attributions regarding contestants, as will those who view a black
contestant versus a white contestant. Finally, I predicted that the attributes of control and
contestant race would interact. Within this interaction, I hypothesized that participants
exposed to a black contestant and deprivation of personal control would be the most
likely to make the most extreme internal attributions. In order to test the interaction
between these variables, a difference score between the composite intelligence scores of
quizmasters and contestants was computed and used for analysis.
Attention checks
Attention was successfully held in most participants. Following the items testing
perceived general knowledge and intelligence of the quizmasters and contestants,
participants were asked to answer several attention checks. The first two of these checks
asked contestants to report the race of the quizmaster and of the contestant. Of all the
participants, only eight misreported the race of the quizmaster and five misreported the
race of the contestant. The third attention check asked participants to report how many
questions the contestant answered correctly. Overall, only seven participants significantly
misreported the number of questions answered correctly, wherein a margin of error of
three questions was considered significant. The final attention check asked participants to
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list as many questions as they could from the video. Only twenty-four participants were
unable to identify at least five of the ten questions.2
Primary Analysis
To test the first prediction, a paired sample t-test was conducted. This analysis
supported the original results of Ross et al. (1977), wherein quizmasters (M = 77.63, SD
= 13.24) were considered more intelligent than contestants (M = 48.14, SD = 14.34),
t(375) = 30.04, p < .01.
In order to test the remaining hypotheses, three separate Race (black contestant,
white contestant) x Control (deprivation of control, no deprivation of control) analysis of
variances (ANOVAs) were conducted.3 The first of these ANOVAs used the composite
intelligence score for the quizmaster. Between the two main effects of Race and Control,
no significant difference was found for either, F(1, 373) = 1.66, p < .20 and F(1, 373) =
.344, p < .56 respectively. Additionally, there was no significant interaction between
Race and Control, F(1, 373) = .035, p < .86. When participants were deprived of control,
they did not rate quizmasters different when viewing white or black contestants (M =
78.77, SD = 13.18) and (M = 77.27, SD = 12.16) respectively. Similarly, when
participants were not deprived of control, quizmasters were rated similarly across both
the white and black contestant conditions (M = 78.23, SD = 14.10) and (M = 76.12, SD
= 13.53) respectively.
The second ANOVA used the composite score of contestant intelligence.
Similarly, no main effects were found for either of the variables of Race or Control, F(1,
372) = 1.26, p < .27 and F(1, 372) = .001, p < .98 respectively. Additionally, no
significant evidence was found to suggest an interaction between Race and Control, F(1,
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372) = .011, p < .92. Participants who were deprived of control did not rate white or
black contestants differently, (M = 48.87, SD = 14.89) and (M = 47.36, SD = 13.29)
respectively. Participants who were not deprived of control also did not rate white or
black contestants differently, (M = 49.07, SD = 14.29) and (M = 47.25, SD = 14.98)
respectively.
The third ANOVA used the difference score between quizmasters and
contestants. Again, no main effects were found for either Race or Control, F(1, 372) =
.002, p < .97 and F(1, 372) = .183, p < .669 respectively. No significant interaction was
found between the variables of Race and Control, F(1, 372) = .002, p < .97. Participants
who were deprived of control did not significantly rate contestants higher or lower than
quizmasters when presented with a white or black contestant, (M = 29.90, SD = 18.13)
and (M = 29.92, SD = 19.93) respectively. Similarly, participants who were not deprived
of control did not rate contestants higher or lower than quizmasters when presented with
either a white or black contestant, (M = 29.16, SD = 19.89) and (M = 28.97, SD = 18.41)
respectively.
Discussion
In this study, I explored the intersections and the effect of personal control and
racial stereotyping on the expression of internal attributions. To my knowledge, this study
is one of the first to investigate the relationship between racial stereotyping and FAE. In
addition, it is the first to analyze the relationship between personal control and FAE
specifically. It is also the first to investigate possible interactions between control and
racial stereotyping.
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In line with Ross et al. (1977) and the existing literature, the quizmaster paradigm
was shown to be robust. Participants consistently and significantly rated quizmasters as
more intelligent than contestants, despite clear situational constraints. However, the
results of this study stand in contrast to the proposed hypotheses in all other aspects.
While some evidence suggests that depriving participants of control will lead to them
creating more extreme internal attributions within the observer bias (Liu & Steele, 1986;
Pittman & Pittman, 1980), this effect was not found in the context of FAE. Participants
who described a positive event they had no control over did not significantly rate
contestants any lower or higher than participants who described a positive event they had
control over.
Two secondary hypotheses also explored the effect of racial biases and whether
Race and Control would interact to affect the internal attributions made regarding
contestants. The results of this study do not support either of these secondary hypotheses.
When participants were presented with black contestants, they were not more likely to
rate them lower in intelligence than participants presented with white contestants. This
lack of difference between perceptions of white and black contestants contrasts with
results from a previous study, which showed that biases against marginalized
communities could elicit a difference in contestant ratings (Peturson et al., 2011).
Furthermore, no evidence was found to support an interaction between Control and Race.
Participants who experienced both the control manipulation and a black contestant were
no more likely to rate contestant intelligence lower than other participants.
Explaining the Results

WHY WE ASK WHY

22

In conclusion, the results of this study did not support any of the proposed
hypotheses, aside from confirming the quizmaster paradigm. These results provide a
contrast to the existing studies that investigate how these variables affect internal
attributions (Liu & Steele, 1986; Peturson et al., 2011; Pittman & Pittman, 1980).
However, the current study differs from these previous studies in fundamental ways
which may explain our results.
In regards to the control manipulation, this study utilized a different methodology
than what was used by Pittman and Pittman in 1980 and later replicated by Liu and Steele
(1986). This study replicated a survey item used by Kay et al. (2008) in a study
examining how control and religious beliefs interact. Although that study does not relate
to the attribution theories investigated here, it seemed to provide a statistically significant
control manipulation that fit well with this study’s methodology. Whereas the control
manipulation used by Pittman and Pittman (1980) required multiple research assistants
and a significant amount of time, the chosen manipulation lent itself well to an online
survey format and was compatible with study sessions that ran multiple participants at
once. Before continuing with this explanatory discussion, it should be noted that the
Pittman and Pittman (1980) manipulation and the Kay et al. (2008) manipulation were
derived from two distinct psychological approaches regarding control. Whereas Pittman
and Pittman (1980) relied on the learned helplessness approach, Kay et al. (2008) relied
on compensatory control. However, simply because their manipulations were derived
from different approaches does not mean that they cannot provide a similar effect in
participants. In fact, no research to my knowledge exists that suggests these two
approaches might produce different worldviews.

WHY WE ASK WHY

23

Despite the previously stated factors and evidence, further investigation indicates
that the chosen manipulation may not have been effective in depriving participants of
control. A manipulation check for control was not included in the measures participants
completed, thus subsequent implications are drawn from extrapolations of the data. A
closer look at the data reveals that the instructions for the control manipulation may have
been unsuccessful. By instructing participants to write “4-6 sentences” about their
experiences, this introduced an unpredicted level of variability. Participants who met the
bare minimum of four sentences may have done so with four brief sentences that may not
have invoked descriptive enough thoughts of the situation to affect feelings of control.
Due to this variability, even a participant who wrote six such brief sentences may not
have been impacted by the manipulation as much as a participant who wrote four lavishly
detailed sentences. Thus, instructing participants to answer based on a number of
sentences was not a standardized approach. Due to the lack of standardization,
participants may not have been as immersed in their past experiences as needed to evoke
the desired effect.
Alternatively, attention checks suggest that the Race manipulation was successful.
As previously stated, only five out of all participants misreported the race of the
contestant. It is likely that inattention can account for the small number of participants
who misreported contestant race, rather than ambiguity or confusion of their race. Thus, it
is reasonable to believe that the Race manipulation was successful. Despite robust
literature which suggest stereotypes regarding black intelligence are ingrained in
American culture (Devine & Elliot, 1995; Kobach & Potter, 2013; Steele, 1997; Steele &
Aronson, 1995; Yoo & Pituc, 2013), there are several mitigating factors which may
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explain the results pertaining to the Race variable. First, due to constraints involving the
videos available for selection, participants only viewed female contestants. It is possible
that using only female contestants may have affected the expression of stereotyping
attitudes. There is no study to my knowledge that analyzes possible differences between
stereotypes of black women and men or that specifically investigates stereotypes of
intelligence regarding black women. Rather, much of the existing literature focusing on
black women revolves around perceptions of sexuality and emotional depth (Cooley,
Winslow, Vojt, Shein & Ho, 2018; Rosenthal & Lobel, 2016; Smith, LaFrance &
Dovidio, 2017). In addition, research suggests that the intersection of gender and race in
black women plays an important role in creating new stereotypes. In other words, the
stereotypes applied to black women are unique and more than simply a combination of
the stereotypes typically applied to black men and white women (Ghavami & Peplau,
2013). Thus, it is possible that contestant ratings did not differ between black and white
contestants due to different stereotypes associated with black men and women.
Another explanation of the results lies in the concept of individuating information.
Individuating information relies on the idea that people tend to rely on stereotypes when
they lack individual information about a target. However, when distinct and unique
information about this target is acquired, people are less likely to rely on stereotypes
(Fiske, Lin, & Neuberg, 1999; Singletary & Hebl, 2009). In terms of racial biases, this
concept applies in that negative racial stereotypes will be more strongly and frequently
endorsed when ambiguity is present (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000). For example, when
employers were asked to rate black and white candidates for a job, there was no
difference between their ratings of the two racial groups when looking at exceptionally
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weak or strong applications. However, implicit racial bias became apparent when
researchers compared ratings of average black candidates and average white candidates
(Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000). This phenomenon is due to exceptionally weak or strong
applications acting as individuating information for those candidates. However, when
neither high nor low performance existed to individuate the black candidate, raters
resorted to stereotypes. This model may also be applied to the quizmaster paradigm.
When participants viewed black contestants answering less questions than expected, this
may have had a similar effect as a weak black candidate for a job. In other words, their
poor performance may have individuated them, thus mitigating the expression of negative
stereotypes.
Limitations
It is important to remain aware that the findings of this study are limited to the
context of the chosen methodology. As outlined above, the control manipulation and
videos were inherently limited in their scope. The lack of a standardized word count on
the control manipulation and the use of only female contestants are both factors which
may have limited the results of the study, as did a lack of a manipulation check.
Furthermore, the quizmaster paradigm presents a highly specific context for the existence
of FAE, which may not be generalizable to everyday occurrences. Due to this, this study
cannot attest to how often FAE is committed or how generalizable it is.
It is also important to note that the source of the participant pool additionally
limits the study. All participants were college students, with the mean age around
nineteen years old. This inherently limits the generalizability of the results to more
diverse populations in terms of age, gender, and race.
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Implications
Despite the null results regarding Race and Control, this study highlights the
robustness of FAE and internal attributions. Even under a modified version of the
quizmaster paradigm, participants consistently rated quizmasters as more intelligent than
contestants. This adds to the existing support for internal attributions, which are held up
by a strong tradition of psychological research. Attribution theories were proposed over
sixty years ago, yet their importance within social psychology has persisted. The various
phenomena that attribution theories encompass have withstood multiple replications and
have been applied to a wide variety of subfields, including clinical, cognitive, and
evolutionary psychology (Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Jones & Harris, 1967; Liu & Steele,
1986; Peturson et al., 2011; Pittman & Pittman, 1980; Ross et al., 1977;).
Despite the importance and widespread application of attribution theories, our
grasp of their mechanics is still limited. Given the null results of this study, this may be
attributed to the complexity of the mechanisms involved in attribution theories. In their
extensive literature review, Gilbert and Malone proposed that the control hypothesis
alone was insufficient in explaining attribution theories (1995). Instead, the authors
mused that perhaps it was a combination of control and culture that created the
intersections of control and attributional theories. According to them, humans have many
methods for reestablishing control, however internal attributions seem to be the method
preferred by Western cultural norms (Gilbert & Malone, 1995).
Admittedly, the addition of culture to the control hypothesis does not directly
explain this study or its results. The majority – if not all – of the participants in this study
were products of Western cultural norms. However, it adds a level of depth to the original
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control hypothesis that naturally leads to the following question: are attribution theories
more complicated than we originally thought? For years following their inception,
hypotheses regarding their causality were neat and self-contained. The control hypothesis
was included among these neat theories. However, perhaps attribution theories cannot be
explained with one neat theory, but instead exist at the intersection of multiple, complex
variables.
Given the multiple theories that exist and the little robust empirical evidence to
support them, further research should be devoted to the causality of attribution theories.
On one hand, perhaps internal attributions can be explained by the original control
hypothesis and the null results of this study are purely a result of an ineffective
manipulation. On the other hand, perhaps internal attributions are caused by several
variables which interact at varying levels. Without further research, there is no way to
determine the truth. This gap in the literature should be remedied, especially considering
the prominence attribution theories hold in social psychology.
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Footnotes
1

The Symbolic Racism Scale was an exploratory item. Analysis showed that the index

created from this scale did not intersect or interact with the data in any significant way.
Due to this, this item is not discussed further in the text.
2

More Stringent standards, where those who missed these checks were excluded from

analysis, did not alter the findings in any way.
3

As a reminder to the reader, all subsequent analysis collapses across the number of

questions contestants answered correctly.

